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McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 The Government of the Virgin Islands (“GVI”) appeals the District Court’s award 
of declaratory and monetary relief on Reefco Services, Inc.’s claim that the GVI violated 
the Dormant Commerce Clause by only collecting its excise tax on imported goods.  
After the District Court entered its Rule 52(a) Opinion and Order, the GVI continued to 
restrict collection of its excise tax to imported goods.  Consequently, the District Court 
enjoined the GVI from collecting the excise tax at all, until the GVI satisfied the court 
that it would be able to collect the excise tax in a constitutional manner.  For the reasons 
that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s award of declaratory, injunctive, and 
monetary relief, in part, and vacate and remand for further proceedings regarding the 
continued necessity of the injunction. 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 





Prior to addressing the merits of the case, given the convoluted post-judgment 
procedural history and promulgation of new rules and regulations by the GVI, we will 
briefly address the justiciability of the matters before us.  Article III authorizes federal 
courts to exercise jurisdiction over “cases” and “controversies” that present live disputes.1  
Even where, as here, neither party contests justiciability, this Court maintains “an 
independent obligation at the threshold to examine whether we have appellate 
jurisdiction.”2  The question raised by the post-judgment filings, decisions, and rules 
promulgated after this appeal is whether circumstances have evolved since this appeal 
was filed that have “forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief,”3 thus rendering the 
appeal moot.  They have not.  For example, the GVI is still obligated to refund to Reefco 
the $5, 287.74 assessed in taxes, but the GVI challenges the propriety of that ruling. 
We must consider three factors before dismissing a case as moot:  
(1) whether the appellant has expeditiously taken all steps necessary to perfect the 
appeal and to preserve the status quo before the dispute became moot, (2) whether 
the trial court’s order will have possible collateral consequences, and (3) whether 
the dispute is of such a nature that it is capable of repetition yet evading review.4 
 
 
1 Hartnett v. Pa. State Educ. Ass’n, 963 F.3d 301, 305 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Summers v. 
Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492-93 (2009)). 
2 Saranchak v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t. of Corr., 802 F.3d 579, 592 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting 
Rendell v. Rumsfield, 484 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2007)). 
3 In re Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). 




The GVI timely perfected its appeal of both the District Court’s September 28, 
2018 Opinion and Judgment as well as the subsequent November 15, 2018 Order and 
November 26, 2018 Memorandum Opinion denying the GVI’s Motion to Stay and 
enjoining the GVI from collecting excise taxes.  As to collateral consequences, the GVI 
claims that the District Court’s injunction is taking a dramatic toll on its revenue.  Yet the 
GVI challenges the propriety of that ruling and argues Reefco suffered no injury because 
it passed the tax deficiency on to its customers.  Finally, though the GVI now contends 
that its promulgation of new rules and regulations in February 2019 moots Reefco’s 
Commerce Clause challenge and eliminates the need for the injunction as well as the 
basis for it,5 the constitutionality of the GVI’s thirty-five-year implementation of the 
excise tax is capable of evading review.  The new rules can, after all, be set aside at the 
GVI’s discretion.  Accordingly, we must adjudicate the merits of the District Court’s 
ruling. 
A. The District Court Correctly Held that 33 V.I.C. § 42, As Implemented by the 
GVI, Violates Dormant Commerce Clause Principles. 
 
In Polychrome International Corporation v. Krigger, we held that, under the 
Territorial Clause, the Virgin Islands is subject to Dormant Commerce Clause principles.6  
 
5 GVI Supp. Br. at 7 (GVI can no longer “fail[] to apply excise tax to local manufacturers 
or importers for goods brought into the territory for business purposes.”). 
6 5 F.3d 1522, 1534 (1993) (“Under the Territorial Clause, Congress has power to 
prescribe all ‘needful Rules and Regulations’ for territories. . . . By necessary implication, 
when territorial enactments affect interstate or foreign commerce—a subject over which 
Congress has supreme control—those enactments must be scrutinized under Dormant 




We are, of course, bound by that ruling.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s test from 
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, governs our inquiry.7   
In Complete Auto, the Supreme Court held that a tax violates the Commerce 
Clause where it “discriminate[s] against interstate commerce[.]”8  During the relevant 
 
territory would have more power over commerce than the states possess.’”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
7 Id. at 1535 (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977)).  Reefco 
argues that the Court should apply the general Dormant Commerce Clause test set forth 
in Cloverland-Green Spring Dairies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Milk Marketing Board, 462 
F.3d 249, 261 (3d Cir. 2006).  Under Cloverland-Green, “[i]n considering whether a state 
law violates the Dormant Commerce Clause, the inquiry is twofold: a court considers first 
whether ‘heightened scrutiny’ applies, and, if not, then considers whether the state law is 
invalid under the Pike [v. Bruce Church, Inc.] balancing test.”  Id. (citation omitted); see 
also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). “Heightened scrutiny applies 
when a law discriminates against interstate commerce in its purpose or effect,” and “[t]he 
party challenging the statute has the burden of proving the existence of such 
discrimination.”  Cloverland-Green, 462 F.3d at 261 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  Where discrimination is proven, the burden shifts to the state to 
demonstrate that “the statute serves a legitimate local purpose, and that this purpose could 
not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory means.”  Id. (quoting Maine v. 
Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986)).  If a discriminatory purpose or effect is not shown 
because the statute “regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public 
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental,” Pike balancing 
requires courts to consider whether “‘the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.’”  Id. at 263 (quoting Pike, 397 U.S. at 
142).  The Court will use the Complete Auto test because, as we noted in Norfolk 
Southern Corp. v. Oberly, that test permits a more nuanced inquiry that addresses the 
unique concerns raised by tax cases.  822 F.2d 388, 399 n.16 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing 
Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 287).  However, even under the Cloverland-Green 
test, the excise tax, while not facially discriminatory and thus not subject to heightened 
scrutiny, fails Pike balancing where the GVI puts forth no legitimate local purpose 
explaining why local manufacturers have not had to pay the excise tax assessed to foreign 
and domestic importers. 




period, the statute setting forth the rate and base of excise taxes as well as any 
exemptions, 33 V.I.C. § 42(a), provided: 
Every individual and every firm, corporation and other association doing business 
in the Virgin Islands, except those specially taxed, exempted, or excluded shall 
pay an excise tax on all articles, goods, merchandise or commodities manufactured 
in or brought into the Virgin Islands for personal use, use in a business, for 
disposition or sale in the course of trade or business, for processing or 
manufacturing or for any other business use or purpose . . . .9 
 
The statute is facially neutral, directing the assessment of an excise tax on “all articles, 
goods, merchandise or commodities manufactured in or brought into the Virgin 
Islands.”10  The regulations implementing this section outline the procedure for 
implementing the tax as to importers, and a statute instructs the Director of the Virgin 
Islands Bureau of Internal Revenue to promulgate appropriate rules and regulations to 
collect the tax from local manufacturers.11  However, in contravention of this statutory 
mandate, no such rules were promulgated until February 2019.12  Thus, the excise tax 
was not assessed on local manufacturers from 1984 until at least as recently as February 
2019.  That failure is nothing short of a blatant “preference for domestic commerce over 
[interstate] commerce.”13  Local manufacturers were afforded a tax break not available to 
 
9 § 42(a). 
10 Id. (emphasis added). 
11 33 V.I. ADC §§ 42b, 42c; 33 V.I.C. § 42a(b). 
12 See JA52-52 (testimony of the Supervisor of Excise Tax as to the BIR practice of only 
assessing an excise tax on items imported into the Virgin Islands); see also 33 V.I. R. & 
Regs. § 42-2(a) (“The excise tax applies to all articles, goods, merchandise, or 
commodities brought into the Virgin Islands.”). 
13 Polychrome, 5 F.3d at 1539 (quoting Kraft Gen. Foods v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 505 




foreign and domestic importers.14  The resulting violation of the Commerce Clause is 
obvious and the GVI’s claims to the contrary do not merit further discussion. 
Because the GVI assessed the excise tax against Reefco in violation of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, the District Court correctly held that Reefco is entitled to a 
refund.  The GVI’s claim that Reefco is not entitled to a refund because it recouped the 
assessment by passing it on to its customers is not supported by anything in this record.15  
Accordingly we will affirm the District Court’s award of money damages.16 
B. The District Court Properly Enjoined the GVI’s Collection of Excise Taxes 
But Exceeded its Authority By Ordering its Approval of Any Promulgated 
Rules and Regulations. 
 
After the District Court issued its September 28th Order declaring the GVI’s 
implementation of the excise tax unconstitutional, the GVI nonetheless continued 
collecting the tax. The Declaratory Judgment Act authorizes trial courts to enforce 
declaratory judgments by providing injunctive relief conditioned upon certain limitations 
not relevant here.17  
 
14 Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 272 (1984) (“[N]o State may 
discriminatorily tax the products manufactured or the business operations performed in 
any other State.”) (citation omitted).  
15 GVI Reply at 4 (“As most Virgin Islanders can attest, despite the absence of the excise 
tax, there has been absolutely no corresponding reduction in the cost to the consumer of 
any goods or services utilizing imports.  As such, the award of money damages to Reefco 
must be reversed.  Such monies have long since been recouped.”) (citation omitted). 
16 See Versarge v. Township of Clinton, 984 F.2d 1359, 1370 (3d Cir. 1993). 
17 Chem. Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.3d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 
1999) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2202 “permits the original [declaratory] judgment to be 





However, the District Court exceeded the scope of its authority when, in addition 
to enjoining the GVI from only collecting excise taxes from importers and not local 
manufacturers, the court effectively mandated that the GVI pass rules and regulations that 
met the court’s approval.  In its November 26th Memorandum Opinion enjoining the GVI 
from continuing to collect excise taxes, the District Court “recognize[d] that the GVI 
[wa]s currently developing additional collection procedures that may bring Section 42 
into compliance with the Commerce Clause.”18  However, the District Court clearly did 
not credit this intention as sufficient given its issuance of an injunction.   
Nor did the District Court find any of the GVI’s subsequent efforts enough to lift 
the injunction.  Four days after the court’s November 26th Memorandum Opinion, the 
GVI filed an Emergency Motion to Lift the Injunction, stating that it had sent letters to 
manufacturing license holders within the territory, explaining they would owe a new tax.  
The court did not respond.  Three months after that the GVI advised the District Court 
that it had promulgated rules and regulations establishing a procedure for the collection 
of excise taxes from local manufacturers.  In response, the District Court did not lift the 
injunction, but it did hold an evidentiary hearing to assess the steps taken by the GVI to 
implement the collection of excise taxes from local manufacturers.19  The court initially 
declined to rule on the outstanding motion given the pending appeal.20  But, four days 
before oral argument, the District Court issued an Order construing the emergency 
 
18 JA205. 
19 GVI Supp. Br. Ex. at 8-114. 




motion as a “renewal and extension” of a post-judgment motion to stay and denied it after 
determining the February 2019 Rules and Regulations still violated the Commerce 
Clause.21   
Thus, the District Court effectively compelled the GVI to enact regulations that 
would meet with the court’s approval.  That was a “bridge too far.”  The Judicial Power 
authorized by Article III vests courts with the power to adjudicate violations of the law, 
not to make law.22  Consequently, if and when the GVI began assessing the excise tax on 
local manufacturers, it complied with the District Court’s judgment, and the court should 
have had no more say in the matter.  As it is not clear from the record whether the GVI 
has begun to collect excise taxes from local manufacturers, we will remand for further 
proceedings on that issue alone with an instruction to the District Court to lift the 
November 26th injunction upon receiving evidence that the GVI is in fact assessing an 
excise tax on local manufactures.  To the extent that the February 2019 Rules and 
Regulations still violate dormant Commerce Clause principles, that issue must be raised 
by an injured party, not the District Court.   
II. 
 
21 Id. at 121, 126.  The parties briefed what effect, if any, the District Court’s December 
6, 2019 Order and Opinion had on this appeal.  Given our holdings regarding the District 
Court’s exercise of its authority to issue injunctive relief under the Declaratory Judgment 
Act, we need not answer that question in this appeal.  Moreover, we deny the motion to 
consolidate the appeal of the December 6th order with this case. 
22 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 n.4 (1998) (“[C]ourts 




We therefore affirm the District Court’s declaratory and monetary relief ordered in 
its September 28th Judgment and Opinion.  We also affirm the District Court’s November 
26th Memorandum Opinion in part, as to its enjoining of the GVI from continuing to 
collect excise taxes from importers, but not local manufacturers.  We vacate the District 
Court’s November 26th Order in so far as it requires court approval of promulgated rules 
and regulations by the GVI and remand for further proceedings as to whether the excise 
tax has been assessed against local manufacturers.  Upon obtaining proof that the GVI is 
assessing the excise tax on local manufacturers, we direct the District Court to lift the 
injunction. 
